

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO**

TIA A. MAHONE,	:	APPEAL NO.	C-250369
Petitioner-Appellee,	:	TRIAL NO.	P/23/1133 Z
vs.	:		
TERRELL D. DALLAS,	:		
Respondent-Appellant.	:		<i>JUDGMENT ENTRY</i>
	:		

KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.

This court sua sponte removes this cause from the regular calendar and places it on the court’s accelerated calendar, and this judgment entry is not an opinion of the court. *See* Rep.Op.R. 3.1; App.R. 11.1(E); Loc.R. 11.1.

In this appeal, respondent-appellant Terrell Dallas (“Father”) challenges the judgment of juvenile court, which denied his objections to administrative child-support and seek-work orders entered by the Hamilton County Child Support Enforcement Administration (“CSEA”). The effect of the juvenile court’s judgment was to leave in place the CSEA’s determination that Father must pay petitioner-appellee Tia Mahone (“Mother”) \$139.48 per month in child support to support the parties’ minor child and must seek employment to enable him to meet his monthly support obligation. For the reasons we explain in this judgment entry, we overrule Father’s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

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In his first and fifth assignments of error, Father asserts that the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in this action, which was instituted when CSEA registered its administrative child-support order against Father with the juvenile court. Father asserts that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over him because CSEA never effectuated service. We review questions of personal jurisdiction, including those related to service of process, under a de novo standard of review. *CUC Properties VI, LLC v. Smartlink Ventures, Inc.*, 2021-Ohio-3428, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.).

With regard to personal jurisdiction, “[i]t is axiomatic that Ohio courts can exercise jurisdiction over a person who is a resident of Ohio.” *Heredia Realty, LLC v. Harvey*, 2021-Ohio-4218, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). Father, however, claims he resides in Texas. Father also claims he did not receive effective service. CSEA sent its registered order by certified mail to an address in West Chester, Ohio, which the record reflects is the residence of Father’s father. The certified mail was signed for by “C.W.” Father contends that he did not reside at the West Chester address, does not recognize the signature, and never authorized anyone to accept service on his behalf.

These alleged deficiencies, however, are immaterial, because Father waited too long to assert a service defect and the resulting lack of personal jurisdiction. Questions of personal jurisdiction must be raised in a party’s first pleading, motion, or appearance. *In re S.H.O.*, 2019-Ohio-645, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). Thus, a party who voluntarily appears and participates in the proceedings waives the ability to challenge personal jurisdiction. *Campbell v. Keith*, 2026 Ohio App. LEXIS 2016, *4-5 (May 29, 2026 1st Dist.). Father did just that. He voluntarily appeared at three hearings before the juvenile court—one on December 11, 2023, one on February 26, 2024, and one on May 1, 2024—and actively participated in them without raising a jurisdictional challenge. Father accordingly waived any argument challenging personal jurisdiction.

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See Edelstein v. Edelstein, 2025-Ohio-4686, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.) (holding that a party waives a personal jurisdiction defense premised on improper service when the party appears at a hearing and actively participates without filing a Civ.R. 12 motion asserting a defect in service). For this reason, Father’s first and fifth assignments of error are overruled.

In his second assignment of error, Father argues that CSEA’s administrative child-support order is invalid because it failed to comply with the 60-day administrative hearing deadline required by R.C. 3111.80(C). The record before us does not reflect whether CSEA did or did not conduct its administrative hearing within this statutory timeframe. But even if it did not, Father’s exclusive remedy to challenge the validity of the order was to file a separate action in the juvenile court under R.C. 2151.231. *See, e.g., In re Z.M.*, 2019-Ohio-1192, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.); *Jabr v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.*, 2016-Ohio-4775, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). An R.C. 2151.231 action must be filed within 14 days of the issuance of CSEA’s administrative support order. *See* R.C. 3111.80(C). Father failed to file such an action. He accordingly waived any challenge related to the 60-day deadline set forth in R.C. 3111.80(C). Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.

In his third assignment of error, Father challenges the validity of CSEA’s seek-work order. As with Father’s argument that CSEA violated the administrative-hearing deadline, this argument is waived. Father did not institute an R.C. 2151.231 action in the juvenile court within 14 days of the issuance of CSEA’s seek-work order. *See Pannell v. McCall*, 2025-Ohio-915 (10th Dist.) (explaining the applicable procedures in the Ohio Administrative Code for when a father wishes to challenge a CSEA administrative order). The third assignment of error is overruled.

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In his fourth assignment of error, Father argues that the juvenile court acted unfairly in permitting Mother’s counsel to orally argue at a hearing on Father’s objections, where Mother had not responded in writing to the objections. Father is incorrect. A trial court has the wide discretion to manage the conduct of hearings before it. *See Ryan v. Ryan*, 2024-Ohio-5691, ¶ 65 (10th Dist.). And nothing in Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) and (D)(4), which govern objections to magistrate’s decisions, requires a party to respond to an opposing party’s objection in writing in order to participate in a hearing on the matter. The juvenile court accordingly acted within its discretion in managing the objection hearing as it saw fit. Father’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.


As all of Father’s assignments of error are overruled, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment constitutes the mandate, (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27, and (3) costs shall be taxed under App.R. 24.

ZAYAS and MOORE, JJ., concur.

To the clerk:

Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/12/2026 per order of the court.

By:  _____
Administrative Judge