IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,	:	APPEAL NOS.	C-260001 C-260002
Plaintiff-Appellee,	:	TRIAL NOS.	C/24/CRB/18177 C/24/CRB/18390
vs.	:		
KENYADA HINTON,	:		
Defendant-Appellant.	:	*JUDGMENT ENTRY*	

KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.

This court sua sponte removes this cause from the regular calendar and places it on the court's accelerated calendar, and this judgment entry is not an opinion of the court. *See* Rep.Op.R. 3.1; App.R. 11.1(E); Loc.R. 11.1.

Defendant-appellant Kenyada Hinton appeals her convictions for making a false allegation against a peace officer and criminal trespass, both misdemeanors.[1] Hinton argues that the trial court erred in managing voir dire, that the convictions were supported by insufficient evidence, and that the false allegation conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

In her first assignment of error, Hinton argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of criminal trespass. More specifically, she challenges the trial court's denial of her Crim.R. 29 motion, which we review under a sufficiency standard. *State v. Harris*, 2025-Ohio-2796, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). To assess whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, we ask "whether after reviewing the evidence in the

[1] Hinton appealed each conviction under a different case number, and this court consolidated the cases for the purpose of appeal.

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *State v. Powell*, 2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Jenks*, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

R.C. 2911.21 provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty of criminal trespass if she, "without privilege to do so, [b]eing on the land or premises of another, negligently fail[s] or refuse[s] to leave upon being notified by signage posted in a conspicuous place." Further, R.C. 2923.126 authorizes political subdivisions to "post a sign in a conspicuous location on [its land or premises] prohibiting persons from carrying firearms or concealed firearms on or onto that land or those premises," and provides that "a person who knowingly violates a posted prohibition of that nature is guilty of criminal trespass" in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(4).

Relevant to these statutes, Hinton acknowledges she brought a firearm into a township administrative building which displayed firearms prohibition signage under R.C. 2923.126. She argues, however, that the State failed to prove that she was notified of the sign or otherwise asked to leave the premises. But the State was not required to prove these facts to establish criminal trespass under R.C. 2911.21. Rather, R.C. 2923.126 indicates that the notice and refusal-to-leave elements of the criminal trespass statute are satisfied when a political subdivision posts a firearm prohibition sign in a conspicuous location. That happened here. Colerain Township Police Department Sergeant Stockmeier testified that there was a large sign posted on the front door of the administrative building warning its entrants that they were prohibited from carrying a deadly weapon on the property. The State also introduced a picture of the sign posted to the door as an exhibit. This evidence was sufficient to

establish that Hinton received notice via signage that was "posted in a conspicuous place." Accordingly, we overrule Hinton's first assignment of error.

In her second assignment of error, Hinton argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of making a false allegation against a peace officer. In support of this contention, Hinton points to a perceived lack of proof that she knew her allegation of sexual assault against an officer was false at the time she filed the report. This argument lacks merit.

"Culpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through circumstantial evidence." (Cleaned up.) *State v. Pride*, 2026-Ohio-3328, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.). In addition, "[a] defendant's state of mind may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances." *Id.*, citing *State v. Murphy*, 2018-Ohio-3506, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). The totality of the circumstantial evidence here supported the trial court's conclusion that Hinton acted knowingly in filing a false report. Before Hinton submitted her complaint, a Colerain police officer informed her that the entirety of her interaction with the officer who allegedly assaulted her had been recorded on a body-worn camera ("bodycam") and that the bodycam footage did not support her claim. In addition, after Hinton submitted her claim, she was given an opportunity to withdraw it after again being confronted with the contradictory bodycam footage. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence was sufficient to prove that Hinton acted with the requisite knowledge that her allegation was false. *See Powell*, 2020-Ohio-4283, at ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). We therefore overrule Hinton's second assignment of error.

In her third assignment of error, Hinton argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to tell prospective jurors during voir dire that all of its witnesses were police officers and to ask specific questions of the venire about how police should behave. With regard to the State's comments, Hinton did not object below, nor did

she raise a plain error argument in her brief on appeal. Thus, she waived this issue for our review. *See State v. Jones*, 2026-Ohio-852, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.) ("The failure to timely object waives all but plain-error review on appeal."); *State v. Ullman*, 2022-Ohio-4683, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.) (noting that an appeals court will not raise a plain error argument on appeal when a party fails to do so itself). With regard to the State's questions, Hinton did not timely object below and, at best, only brought the issue to the trial court far after it occurred. *See Kelley v. Horton*, 2025-Ohio-5252, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.) ("An objection is timely when the issue raised could have been avoided or corrected by the court."). Because the objection was untimely, and because Hinton did not raise a plain error argument on appeal, this issue is also waived. *See Ullman* at ¶ 18. Hinton's third assignment of error is overruled.

In her fourth assignment of error, Hinton argues that the State's attempt to discuss the elements of criminal trespass with the venire was improper. Hinton objected to these comments, and the trial court sustained the objection. An appellate court can grant the appellant no relief when "the trial court has already granted [her] the relief [she] seek[s]." *Williams v. Tumblin*, 2014-Ohio-4365, ¶ 42 (5th Dist.). We overrule Hinton's fourth assignment of error.

Finally, in her fifth assignment of error, Hinton argues that her conviction for making a false allegation was against the manifest weight of the evidence. A manifest-weight challenge requires us to independently "weigh[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses, and determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." *State v. Reillo*, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 26, quoting *State v. Brown*, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 30. We afford substantial deference to the credibility

determinations of the trier of fact because the trier directly observes the witnesses during trial proceedings. *Id* at ¶ 28. "Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is warranted only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." (Cleaned up.) *State v. Estill*, 2026-Ohio-2101, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.), quoting *State v. Martin*, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

Hinton's manifest weight argument rests on the absence of bodycam footage and other video evidence that might have corroborated her story. She also points to further actions police could have taken to investigate her claim. While appellate courts can consider whether the factfinder "disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence that weighed against conviction," that evidence must be in the record, and this information is not. *See State v. McDonald*, 2023-Ohio-1987, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). Without such proof, Hinton's claim that additional investigation or footage would have supported her version of events is merely speculation. Thus, we overrule Hinton's fifth assignment of error.

Having overruled Hinton's five assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment constitutes the mandate, (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27, and (3) costs shall be taxed under App.R. 24.

BOCK and **MOORE, JJ.,** concur.

To the clerk:

Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/25/2026.

Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their counsel if represented, a copy of the court's judgment and note such action on the docket.

By: Jennifer A. Hensley
Administrative Judge