IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,	:	APPEAL NO. C-260116 TRIAL NO. C/25/CRB/17678
Plaintiff-Appellee,	:	
vs.	:	
MADISON BOOKS,	:	*JUDGMENT ENTRY*
Defendant-Appellant.	:	

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.

For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.

The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk:

Enter upon the journal of the court on 10/7/2026.

Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their counsel if represented, a copy of the court's judgment and note such action on the docket.

By: Jennifer Hensley
Administrative Judge

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STATE OF OHIO,	:	APPEAL NO. C-260116 TRIAL NO. C/25/CRB/17678
Plaintiff-Appellee,	:	
vs.	:	*O P I N I O N*
MADISON BOOKS,	:	
Defendant-Appellant.	:	

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 7, 2026

Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and *Paula E. Adams,* Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Angela W. Chang, Hamilton County Public Defender, and *Joshua A. Thompson*, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.

NESTOR, Judge.

{¶1} Following a heated argument and accusations of infidelity, former fiancés Madison Books and Andrew Ingles left their night at an amusement park separately. Upon returning home, Books discovered several of her belongings defaced and scattered throughout the pair's home. In response to her discovery, Books emerged from the home and vented her frustrations on Ingles's truck. Unfortunately for Books, her act of retaliation was captured by a door camera.

{¶2} Following a bench trial, the court found Books guilty of criminal damaging in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). On appeal, Books challenges her conviction and restitution order for repairs to the truck. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶3} On October 3, 2025, Books and Ingles visited the Land of Illusion Adventure Park. They were drinking prior to, on their way to, and at the theme park. The two began arguing after a security guard advised Books not to get in Ingles's truck due to his intoxication. Books testified that Ingles accused her of infidelity with the security guard and drove home without her. Books ordered an Uber to take her home.

{¶4} Upon returning home, Ingles continued his night at a nearby bar where he stayed for approximately one to one-and-a-half hours. Books arrived home before Ingles and found several of her belongings broken and strewn about the house. Disillusioned with the night, Books left the house.

{¶5} In a video captured by a Google Nest camera, Books stepped off the stairs leading to the house and onto the hood of Ingles's truck—a 2017 Silverado C71 Crew Cabin. Throughout the video, Ingles made crude remarks to Books over the camera system (apparently by remote observation). Books jumped up and down on

the hood of the truck approximately four times before stepping onto the roof of the cabin, where she jumped approximately 34 times. The reverberation of each jump is audible with each jump. Books then stepped off the truck and re-entered the house.

{¶6} A neighbor called the police to report a woman jumping on a truck, throwing items at a house, and yelling. Mt. Healthy Police Officer A. Jones responded to the house. Upon arrival, Officer Jones first encountered Books. After Books indicated that she was safe, Officer Jones walked back down the driveway. There, he noticed the damage to Ingles's truck. He testified that he noticed handprints and footprints on the vehicle's roof and hood, oil smeared on the vehicle, and that the roof was "severely caved in."

{¶7} By this time, Ingles returned from the bar and advised Officer Jones that he had Nest video footage. Although he could not make out any facial features, Officer Jones recognized Books as the individual jumping in the video based on her clothing. Books also admitted at trial that she was the individual in the video. Books claimed she did not intend to cause permanent damage to the car. Later that night, Officer Jones returned to the residence. Books was subsequently charged with one count of criminal damaging in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). Following a bench trial, the court found Books guilty.

A. Restitution and Sentencing Hearings

{¶8} At the restitution hearing, Ingles testified that he received a quote from Schmoe's Collision to repair the damage to his truck. Over defense counsel's objection to Ingles's lack of personal knowledge, Ingles testified to the damage sustained and the estimated repair charges. The trial court found the total amount of the estimate—$6,005.38—to be reasonable. The court ordered Books to pay the full amount in restitution.

{¶9} Books now appeals raising two assignments of error.

II. Analysis

{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Books argues that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In her second assignment of error, Books argues that the trial court's restitution order was not supported by competent credible evidence and exceeded the economic loss caused by the offense.

A. First Assignment of Error

{¶11} In her first assignment of error, Books argues that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the prosecuting witness, Ingles, lacked credibility. Although not explicitly stated in her assignment of error, Books also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence by arguing that the evidence demonstrated that she acted recklessly rather than knowingly. We address both arguments.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶12} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence used to support a criminal conviction, we "must examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." *State v. Anderson*, 2017-Ohio-8641, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Jenks*, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. "'The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" *Id.*, quoting *Jenks* at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶13} To sustain a conviction under R.C. 2909.06(A)(1), the State needed to prove that Books knowingly caused, or created, a substantial risk of physical harm to

Ingles's property without his consent. R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). Books argues that the State failed to establish that she acted knowingly.

{¶14} "A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature." R.C. 2901.22(B). We have held that "a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of [his or her] acts." *State v. Heap*, 2004-Ohio-5850, ¶ 28-29 (1st. Dist.) (holding that a defendant acted knowingly to sustain an attempted arson conviction, despite his own beliefs and risk perception, when he flipped a car onto or near an open fire).

{¶15} Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that Books acted knowingly. Books explicitly admitted to jumping on Ingles's truck, and the State presented video evidence of her doing so. Although Books argues that she did not intend to cause permanent damage, the natural consequences of repeatedly jumping on a vehicle reasonably include damaging the truck. *See id.* at ¶ 29. Although physical dents are not discernible in the Nest video, the sound of the hood and roof reverberating and moving with each jump leaves little to no room to suggest that Books did not act knowingly.

2. Manifest Weight

{¶16} In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, "a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge looks to whether the State met its burden of persuasion." *State v. Reillo*, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 24, citing *State v. Messenger*, 2021-Ohio-2044, ¶ 44-45 (10th Dist.). The manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard refers to whether there is a "'*greater amount of credible evidence* . . . to support one side of the issue rather than the other.'" (Emphasis added in *Thompkins*.) *Id.* at ¶ 25, quoting *State v. Thompkins*, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). When deciding whether a

judgment entered by the trial court is against the manifest weight of evidence, the appellate court "'must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.'" *Id.* at ¶ 28, quoting *Eastley v. Volkman*, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21. This is an exceptional remedy that we reserve for cases where "'the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.'" *State v. Cook*, 2024-Ohio-4771, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.), quoting *Thompkins* at 387. "There must be something more than a mere inconsistency" to warrant reversal. *Reillo* at ¶ 32.

{¶17} Books challenges the credibility of Ingles, the prosecuting witness. First, she argues that Ingles's testimony lacked credibility because he was intoxicated on the night of the incident. However, Ingles's intoxication alone is insufficient to undermine his credibility as a witness. *See State v. Harrison*, 2023-Ohio-471, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Melton*, 2016-Ohio-1227, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (noting that "a witness's intoxication in and of itself is not a sufficient basis to completely undermine his or her testimony absent something in the record demonstrating that the intoxication rendered the witness incapable of accurately recalling the events.").

{¶18} Second, Books argues that Ingles was a "biased observer," highlighting that Ingles was angry with Books when he left her at the Land of Illusion and made inappropriate, crude remarks to her over the Nest video system.

{¶19} Despite both arguments, the trial court "was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses[.]" *State v. McCollum*, 2025-Ohio-3254, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Reynolds*, 2021-Ohio-963, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). A "mere inconsistency" is insufficient to find that a conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. *Reillo*, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, at ¶ 32. Based on the evidence before us, we cannot say the trial court lost its way in assessing Ingles's credibility, especially given the video evidence corroborating his testimony.

{¶20} Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.

B. Second Assignment of Error

{¶21} In her second assignment of error, Books argues that the restitution order was not supported by competent, credible evidence to a reasonable degree of certainty and exceeds the economic loss caused by the offense. We review "a nonfelony restitution order for an abuse of discretion." *State v. Dunn*, 2026-Ohio-241, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), citing *State v. Haskett*, 2024-Ohio-5933, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). A trial court abuses its discretion "'if the award of restitution is not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record from which the court can discern the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.'" *State v. Moore*, 2023-Ohio-3318, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), quoting *State v. Caldwell*, 2023-Ohio-355, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.).

{¶22} A court may order an offender to pay a victim restitution in an amount based on the victim's economic loss. R.C. 2929.28(A)(1); *Moore* at ¶ 11. "'Economic loss' is defined as 'any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of an offense[.]'" *Moore* at ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 2929.01(L). The State bears the burden of proving the amount of restitution. *Id.* at ¶ 11, citing *Caldwell* at ¶ 16. Damage to a vehicle may be established "by estimates demonstrating the reasonable cost to repair the vehicle." *Id.* at ¶ 12, citing *Caldwell* at ¶ 17.

{¶23} Books argues her actions were not the direct and proximate cause of the damage to Ingles's truck. She contends that Ingles could not directly connect her jumping on the hood to the damage claimed because at trial Ingles described the damage as only "small dents" on the cab and a scratched hood. Books takes issue with the fact that the estimate calls for a full roof replacement, removal and resealing of the windshield and rear glass, color work, front mirror replacement, and a car cover.

{¶24} We addressed a similar argument in *State v. McKinney*, 2025-Ohio-4826 (1st Dist.). In *McKinney*, the defendant admitted to throwing a brick at the windshield of the prosecuting witness's car but argued that his action was not the direct and proximate cause of additional damage to the hood. *Id.* at ¶ 15-16. We rejected that argument, noting that hood damage was a foreseeable result of throwing a brick at a windshield because "the hood is a logical place for the brick to land." *Id.* at ¶ 16. Similar to *McKinney*, damage to component parts of Ingles's vehicle was a foreseeable result of Books repeatedly jumping on the hood and roof.

{¶25} Books also challenges the competency and credibility of the evidence presented at the restitution hearing. Books highlights that Ingles was not a car mechanic and did not prepare the repair estimate. Nevertheless, the trial court "was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses[.]" *McCollum*, 2025-Ohio-3254, at ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing *Reynolds*, 2021-Ohio-963, at ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). We previously held a restitution award was supported by "ample evidence" where the prosecuting witness testified to the damage to her vehicle, the amount of the repair already undertaken, and the estimate for repairs still needed, and supported her testimony with exhibits setting forth the cost of the repairs. *McKinney* at ¶ 4, 18.

{¶26} Here, Ingles testified at the restitution hearing to the damage to his truck and submitted his repair estimate as an exhibit. Despite Books's concern that Ingles was not qualified to testify regarding the damage, the State was not required to lay an evidentiary foundation on this matter at the restitution hearing. *See City of Cleveland v. Figueroa*, 2022-Ohio-4012, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing *City of Strongsville v. Kane*, 2012-Ohio-3372, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.) (explaining that the city was not required to lay an evidentiary foundation before presenting a written repair estimate in a restitution hearing because a trial court is not restricted by the rules of evidence in sentencing).

{¶27} The trial court was in the best position to assess Ingles's testimony regarding the damage to his truck. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Books to pay Ingles restitution in the amount of $6,005.38.

{¶28} Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶29} Having overruled both assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and **CROUSE, J.,** concur.